INTRODUCTION
It was a cold day in January 2011. The holidays were over and Cristina Martinez was back at work in the office of the Chief Financial Officer at Controladora Comercial Mexicana (Comerci), a Mexican retailer.
1 Comerci had just successfully emerged from bankruptcy a few days before Christmas. Life in the CFO's office was very uncertain. The boss who had hired her, Francisco De La Vega, had been suspended as CFO by recommendation of the Mexican financial authorities for his contributions to Comerci's financial distress. She wanted to impress her new boss, CFO Jose Calvillo with her analytical skills and insights into Comerci's past financial distress and into Comerci's future -how best to insure that the firm was back on stable ground. Comerci had engaged in risky derivative and currency trading which seemed to have caused its financial distress. But, Cristina was not sure this was the entire story. She wondered whether fundamental flaws existed in the firm pre-and post-bankruptcy, and if so, were they as important as Comerci's wrong currency bets? Cristina had lived through Comerci's bankruptcy filing. Now she wanted to do her best to contribute to making Comerci successful post bankruptcy. Despite a clear upward trend in revenues, the growth that Comerci would need to remain competitive was restricted by the structured debt that it took on following its reorganization. Some equity analysts believed the company needed to sell off one or more of its business units. Would the firm need to reduce its size in 2011 to be better positioned for its future?
CONTROLADORA COMERCIAL MEXICANA
Founded in 1944, on April 25, 1991, Comerci had its initial public offering (IPO) on both the Mexican and US stock exchanges. By 2011, Comerci was a holding company operating retail stores and family restaurants in Mexico. Tiendas Comercial Mexicana (TCM) was the retailing business, with a portfolio of retail stores (Comercial Mexicana, Mega, Bodega, Sumesa, Alprecio, City Market, and Fresko) targeting different segments of the market. Comerci also owned a 50% of Costco Mexico, through a joint venture with the American warehouse club Costco. The restaurants business segment included California Restaurantes and Beer Factory. A real estate subsidiary was also consolidated by Comerci.
In 2011, with an estimated 8% market share, 2 Comerci's closest public competitors were Soriana and Wal-Mart Mexico. Chedraui, a private firm which was expected to go public soon was another player in this industry. Exhibit 1 provides selected financials from peers. Exhibit 2 provides selected statistics and market information of Comerci's segments by the end of 2010. Exhibit 3 shows subsidiaries classified by target markets according to economic level of customers.
THE DERIVATIVE CRISIS, OCTOBER 2008 3
Comerci's financial history was solid through the third quarter of 2008. Revenues had grown every year in the 2000s, with 2007 revenues of more than MXN 50 billion in The derivative losses had been driven by the sudden depreciation of the Mexican peso against the US dollar. The exchange rate slowly declined from 11 to about 10 between January and September 2008. It suddenly surpassed 11 at the beginning of October reaching 13 USD-MXN within ten days (Exhibit 10). As a result of this devaluation, the firm could not honor margin calls on its derivatives contracts and filed for bankruptcy protection. In the following weeks, JPMorgan Chase & Co., Goldman Sachs and others sued Comerci in New York State court. Mexican banks and financial institutions also sued the firm in Mexico City. The losses related to currency derivatives incurred by Comerci in August-September 2008 were estimated to be around USD 1.4 billion, making it the second largest loss of a company in an emerging economy in this recent financial crisis, only followed by Citic Pacific from Hong Kong.
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WHAT WENT WRONG?
Comerci had historically entered the derivative markets to cover its exposure to interest rates and exchange rates changes, as it had both local currency and USD denominated debt, and also imported goods (hence, had payables in USD) while its costumers paid with Mexican pesos. In 2008 the firm imported goods worth USD 55 million.
7 One difficult to explain fact after this was how a company with such a relatively low level of imports and with a total debt of around USD 500 million as of the second quarter of 2008 could have accumulated debt of approximately USD 2 billion in the following months by trying to "hedge its currency risk."
In 10 Comerci imported some of its goods in US dollars. The firm's main concern was about the dollar appreciating which would make imported goods more expensive. In the beginning of 2008 US dollars instead became cheaper, and Comerci shorted dollars, more than offsetting its previous long position in dollars and actually exposing the firm to foreign exchange risk. Comerci would have benefited if the dollar continued to depreciate. Reality in October moved in the opposite direction. Comerci expected an exchange rate around USD-MXN 10.5; instead, the exchange rate actually rose to about 14. 11 Comerci bets were not only in the wrong direction, but led to exponentially increasing potential losses. 12 In the 2008 Third Quarter Earnings Conference Call on , under the pressure from analysts asking about the derivative crisis, Francisco De La Vega, CFO of Comerci ended the conference stating: "What I can tell you is that for sure the company does not enter in any new derivatives. Not now, forever." 13 Cristina had not been directly involved in the disastrous hedging operations, which perhaps was why she had retained her job in the CFO's office, but she recognized that at some point legitimate hedging to protect from currency fluctuation had turned into speculation.
DEBT AND LOSSES RELATED TO DERIVATIVES
Cristina watched, with worry about her future and the future of the firm as Comerci's total debt grew. By the end of 2007 Comerci's gross debt was MXN 5,282 million, equivalent to about USD 484 million, all long term, and all unsecured.
14 Exhibit 5 shows the total amount and Exhibit 11 provides details on debt characteristics. Net debt, net of cash and short term investments, was MXN 3,390 million, for a net debt to equity ratio of 0.15x. Of the total debt, USD 200 million was dollar-denominated. Exhibit 12 provides selected prices, yields and volatilities of the USD 200 bond issue before and after this major financial problem. Yields for Mexican government securities at different maturities are provided in Exhibit 13.
Due to the losses on the derivative financial operations in 2008, Comerci's liquidity was seriously affected after it covered MXN 4,347 million (equivalent to USD 316 million) as collateral for margin calls. 15 The firm had credit lines with the derivative counterparties, and every time marking-to-market of the derivatives exceeded the credit line, a margin call was posted. The last margin call was paid by Comerci on October 3. 16 On October 8, one day before the bankruptcy protection filing, the firm and the banks estimated that the losses related to derivatives were around USD 1.4 billion. After deducting the paid margin calls, USD 1.08 billion was due. 17 As this amount (equivalent to about MXN 13,000 million) was not fully recognized by Comerci when it filed for bankruptcy protection, 18 it was not reported as debt in the balance sheet in 2008, but rather as a prudential reserve in "other current liabilities" (Exhibit 5). This reserve was charged as "restructuring charges" on the income statement.
Since Comerci stopped paying its liabilities, banks and other financial institutions sued the firm. As a consequence, all debt, totaling MXN 12,600 million (USD 905 million, Exhibit 11), became due in 2008, and changed from long-term to short term debt. Thus, by the end of 2008 Comerci's actual debt increased to MXN 25,600 (12,600 debt plus 13,000 prudential reserve), equivalent to approximately USD 1.9 billion. Furthermore, even though the firm's cash and short term investments totaled MXN 2,343 million (Exhibit 5), almost all this amount was used as collateral and was taken by the banks as payments for their claims, leaving Comerci's cash at close to zero. 19 Thus, the liquidity position of the firm was precarious by the end of 2008, with a debt to equity ratio of 1.9 times. In addition, accounts payable were about MXN 9,700 million. This situation remained about the same in 2009 (Exhibit 11). However, as the bankruptcy protection was at the holding company level, the subsidiary Tiendas Comercial Mexicana (TCM) was able to receive of the end of October 2008 a MXN 327 million direct loan from IXE commercial bank and MXN 1,000 million by NAFINSA (Exhibit 11), which allowed operations to continue. NAFINSA was a Mexican development bank whose mission was to promote the development and modernization of the industrial sector. These loans were to be used exclusively for suppliers, and were guaranteed by TCM with its real estate assets at a ratio of real estate value to loan amount of 1.5 to 1.0. 20 In addition, Comerci suppliers were granted access to a MXN 2,000 million accounts receivable factoring program by NAFINSA, via a national program called Productive Supply Chains.
Cristina was happy that the firm obtained the loans since these would alleviate Comerci's immediate financial problems. She -and analysts who followed Comerciwondered whether this would be enough for the firm to survive bankruptcy. The NAFINSA loan had to be paid back on a monthly basis in two years, with a three month grace period. Accounts payable was very high compared to these loans, so Comerci had to commit its income in the near future for operations rather than loan repayments. No other loans were foreseeable in the following months until Comerci resolved its core financial problems related to the derivative financial investments.
THE BANKRUPTCY PROCESS
Mexico's Concurso Mercantil was similar to U.S. Chapter 11 (restructuring) bankruptcy law. As in the US, either the company or its creditors could file for bankruptcy. Firms could borrow "debtor in possession" financing in which new creditors had priority over old, pre-bankruptcy debtholders. Reorganization was preferred to liquidation and "pre-packaged" or predetermined bankruptcy filings were allowed. Cases were heard in federal district court where the bankruptcy petition was filed. Bankruptcy cases were overseen by a special division of the Federal Judiciary Council, the IFECOM (Instituto Federal de Especialistas de Concursos Mercantiles), a program similar to the US Trustee Program.
However, there were differences. In the US, the creditors formed a committee to represent the interests of all the debtholders. Management also was expected to put the needs of the debtholders before those of the shareholders. Under Mexican law, creditors who represented at least 10% of total liabilities could ask for the appointment of an "interventor" to protect their interests, but instead of the fees associated with this paid by the firm as a bankruptcy cost, the creditors themselves paid these expenses. The interventor oversaw the process, but had no say in management's actions. The debtor, the firm filing for bankruptcy, approved the reorganization plan, along with a simple majority of creditors. Inside debtors, for example, subsidiaries of the bankrupt parent company voted as creditors and were more likely to support company management. Few large companies had filed under the relatively new (2000) bankruptcy law, and Comerci's derivative transactions made determinations of value more difficult.
Comerci had difficulties going through the bankruptcy process in the months following its derivatives problem. It was by the end of May 2010, following Comerci's announcement of an agreement for debt restructuring with the majority of its creditors, when the bankruptcy proceedings started to move toward a possible solution. This was considered to be a milestone in Mexico as multinational companies typically tried to avoid restructuring in the courts and often spent years in out-of-court negotiations with lenders in New York, Dallas or Madrid.
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THE END OF BANKRUPTCY AND ANALYSTS CONCERNS
Eduardo Estrada, an analyst from Banamex-Citibank stated: "While the market has reacted positively to this announcement [On the debt restructuring agreement], we prefer to be cautious regarding the potential of the increase in the stock price since not enough details regarding the agreements were released." 22 In general, the main concern of analysts by then was that Comerci might be sacrificing its future expansion and competitiveness by paying high "penalties" for the reorganization, especially as its competitors were expanding and the retailers were in the middle of a fierce price war. 23 Analysts were also speculating that under the pressure from creditors, the firm might sell assets.
About two years earlier, in November 2008, Jose Calvillo Golzarri, the executive in charge of the restructuring who later became chief financial officer declared, "We already have a way to pay and part of it will be through an asset sale. We are evaluating which assets will go on sale." Comerci's fixed assets were worth around USD 3 billion. 24 An ING analyst estimated that Comerci's enterprise value in November 2008 was between $1,721 and $2,948 million, with Enterprise Value (EV) to EBITDA multiple of 2.4x, far below its competitors. (WALMEX's multiple was around 12x, Soriana's was 9.5 and Costco USA 8.5x.) 25 In July 2010 more information was made public by the company. 26 Parties holding more than 85 percent of Comerci's debt were supporting the restructuring plan. Under the pre-approved plan both derivative counterparties and bank creditors would exchange claims for a share in a new debt, and note holders would receive a portion of new bonds. 27 On August 9, 2010, a Mexican judge accepted Comerci's insolvency petition. Comerci presented a "prepackaged" debt restructuring proposal to repay creditors about $1.5 billion over eight years. 28 A few days before Christmas, on December 22, 2010 a New York state judge approved Comerci's exit from Chapter 15 bankruptcy protection, notifying the firm and creditors. 29 The judge's approval of the debt restructuring proposal ended more than two years of negotiations.
Several issues arose during the bankruptcy protection period. For example, since it was in financial distress, Comerci was late in filing its 2008 annual report, which was completed on June 4, 2009. Its auditor, PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP, gave an unqualified opinion expressing doubt about the company. Later, in November 2009, the firm was charged USD 3.8 million by Mexican regulators for inappropriate disclosure of derivatives. In addition, the company was asked to suspend Francisco De La Vega at least for two years as CFO due to lack of transparency about derivatives information.
RESTRUCTURED DEBT
"I was on the team that worked hard on restructuring the debt. We ended with more debt than we would have liked, and more debt that is typical for a firm emerging from bankruptcy," Cristina said. The restructured debt consisted of new instruments to be paid in eight years or sooner. As Exhibit 5 shows, the total debt as of the end of 2010 was MXN 20,028 million (19,865.8 long-term plus 162.9 short term). A breakdown of the new debt is shown in Exhibit 14 by tranche and securities characteristics. In addition, this exhibit provides estimates of debt service (amortization and interest) projected for the following years.
Unlike the old debt, all new, restructured debt was guaranteed by assets. For instance, Tranche 3 had Costco's 50% share as guarantee. The market value of the firm's assets was estimated to be at least equal to the restructured debt. 30 New debt covenants included restrictions on leverage and interest coverage ratios. 31 In addition, Comerci was not allowed to pay dividends or contract additional debt. The firm could not invest more than MXN 900 million in capital expenditures per year and could contract working capital credit lines only up to MXN 3,400 million. More importantly, at least 60% of any cash surplus after debt service had to be used to prepay debt. 32 Thus, expansion was restricted, and free cash flow was almost totally committed to service or prepay debt.
POST-BANKRUPTCY
Comerci slightly improved its performance in 2010 compared to 2009. Sales grew by 1.5%. Same store sales increased by 0.5%, attributed to a more aggressive pricing policy and a better assortment of merchandise. Net income in 2010 was MXN 1,030 million, compared with MXN 345 million in 2009 (Exhibit 4). In January 2011 CFO José Calvillo informed Reuters that the firm was planning to cut its debt in order to reactivate capital expenditures. "We are trying to reduce the debt over the next three, four years by around… 6 billion pesos (USD 500 million)…We are going to return to growth." The firm announced it could sell USD 130 million in assets in 2011, and use this cash to prepay debt. In particular, the firm planned to invest USD 82 million to open 10 new stores in 2011. 33 Equity analysts wondered whether this would be enough as competition in this arena was fierce. Comerci was expected to lose its position as the third largest retail company in Mexico with Chedraui taking third place by 2011. Trapped because of covenants on the restructured debt, it looked like the firm would need to sell assets to reduce debt and return to appropriate levels of store expansion.
POSSIBLE FUTURES
By March 2011, an Actinver analyst estimated Comerci's market capitalization in MXN 19,455 million and enterprise value of MXN 35,907 million. The analyst commented on the firm's successful emergence from bankruptcy, but noted concerns about its future. 34 Comerci's equity was called an "interesting asset with a number of possibilities that could enhance its potential growth in the coming years." 35 To illustrate the previous statement two scenarios are provided in Exhibit 15. The first scenario shows the situation of the firm, with values of the end of 2010, with estimated EV to EBITDA multiples by store format. With an implicit enterprise value of MXN 35,907 million, the market cap is MXN 19,455 million after deducting net debt and minority interest. A second scenario assumes the firm sells off its stores (with the exception of Mega and Costco) in 2011 receiving a 10% premium, and repays debt. In this scenario, the market capitalization is slightly better and the net debt to EBITDA improves. Other financial combinations might also be feasible.
Estimates by several equity analysts on selected financial statements items for Comerci and peers, are provided in Exhibit 16. Comerci had an EV to EBITDA multiple of 8.3 times by the end of 2010, trading at approximately a 30% discount compared to peers (8.3 vs. 11.6 times for the peers average). Growth for 2011 was estimated to be low to moderate, with 3.1% growth expected by the firm. 36 Margins were projected to remain similar to 2010. 37 "The high debt was restrictive," Cristina said. "By the second quarter of 2011, revenues were growing, but we were not growing as fast as we had in the past because of the large amount of structured debt on the books." Cristina wondered if the firm needed to reduce its size in 2011, as suggested by analysts, to be better positioned for its future.
Cristina recognized that there were substantial doubts about the future success of her employer. Cristina was concerned that Comerci would lose market share to its powerful competitors if it was unable to continue to invest in improvements and expansions. Could Comerci take on more debt, or would additional debt risk a second bankruptcy? Cristina knew that the Altman Z score was used to assess the degree of financial stress. She also read that the Black and Scholes model, typically used to price financial options, could be used to gain insights about a firm's debt costs and was particularly useful in analyzing financially distressed firms. Exhibit 17 provides background information on Altman Z score and Black/Scholes model. She knew that such quantitative techniques, together with fundamental analysis of the firm, would help her to better assess the firm and make recommendations to her boss about Comerci's ability to raise more funds through new debt issues. Or, could Comerci raise funds through the sale of assets, in particular, could or should Comerci sell its Costco stake? Equity was also an option, but one that her boss said was not under consideration. Shareholders had lost substantially because of the bankruptcy reorganization and the firm did not want to dilute its new shareholders with more equity at current low prices unless there was no other viable alternative. Given the current state of the firm, post-bankruptcy, what choice would best position Comerci to continue to be one of Mexico's leading retailers? Had the firm emerged from bankruptcy in a strong enough position to continue in its very competitive industry? Cristina was determined to present a thorough analysis of Comerci's prospects which would show the firm's position relative to how it had operated pre-bankruptcy. She needed to evaluate the terms of the firm's debt and look for alternatives to the firm's current high debt burden. On a personal note, she also hoped she could reassure herself that her job was safe and Comerci was well on the road to recovery. Scenario 2 assumes the firm sells off several of its stores in 2011 (zero EBITDA growth is assumed) at a 10% premium paid by the market. Minority interest is usually multiplied by the P/BV multiple. In this case it is assumed to be 1.0. The actual average P/BV in 2010 was 0.98 (Source: Capital IQ).
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Exhibit 17 Altman's Z Score and Black & Scholes
Altman's Z score
The Z score is a linear relationship consisting of five ratios. It is appropriate to include this not only in a discussion of bankruptcy, but in a discussion of risk or ratio analysis. The Z score is: Z = 6.56A + 3.26B + 6.72C +1.05D where, A = working capital/total assets B = retained earnings/total assets C = earnings before interest and taxes/total assets D = book value of equity/total liabilities For publicly traded non-manufacturing firms, financially sound firms have Z scores above 2.6, firms that may be deteriorating financially have Z scores from 1.1 to 2.6, and firms that have a high probability of bankruptcy have Z scores below 1.1. The above ratios measure liquidity (A), shareholders claims against assets which are low for a highly levered firm (B), profitability (C), and shareholder confidence relative to debt, which is low for a highly levered firm (D). Altman's Z can be used as a bankruptcy predictor, a predictor for change in a firm's bond rating, or a tool to assess credit risk.
Black/Scholes Model
Option pricing theory can be used to evaluate default risk. It is difficult to use discounted cash flow valuation models if a firm has negative cash flows. Shareholders have limited liability, and in the case of a distressed firm, are more likely to exercise their option to liquidate the firm, pay off the debt, and walk away. One can think of shareholders and bondholders in terms of option pricing theory.
Shareholders have a residual claim on the firm -they are entitled to everything left over after bondholders have been paid. To value a firm's equity using option pricing theory, inputs in the Black-Scholes option pricing model are: S (stock price in the original model) = Value of the firm, the value of the firm's debt + equity; X (exercise price in original model) = the amount of debt that the firm owes; T (time) = term of the debt, or, in the case of a distressed firm, how much time the market says the firm has left; σ = standard deviation of the firm's assets, in this case, the firm's debt and equity; R = risk free rate, for the term of the option.
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